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Abstract
The Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer (Maude-NPA) is a tool and inference sys-
tem for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in which the
cryptosystems satisfy different equational properties. It both extends and pro-
vides a formal framework for the original NRL Protocol Analyzer, which sup-
ported equational reasoning in a more limited way. Maude-NPA supports a
wide variety of algebraic properties that includes many crypto-systems of inter-
est such as, for example, one-time pads and Diffie-Hellman. Maude-NPA, like
the original NPA, looks for attacks by searching backwards from an insecure
attack state, and assumes an unbounded number of sessions. Because of the
unbounded number of sessions and the support for different equational theo-
ries, it is necessary to develop ways of reducing the search space and avoiding
infinite search paths. In order for the techniques to prove useful, they need not
only to speed up the search, but should not violate completeness, so that failure
to find attacks still guarantees security. In this paper we describe some state
space reduction techniques that we have implemented in Maude-NPA. We also
provide completeness proofs, and experimental evaluations of their effect on the
performance of Maude-NPA.
1. Introduction
The Maude-NPA [4, 7] is a tool and inference system for reasoning about
the security of cryptographic protocols in which the cryptosystems satisfy differ-
ent equational properties. The tool handles searches in the unbounded session
model, and thus can be used to provide proofs of security as well as to search for
attacks. It is the next generation of the NRL Protocol Analyzer [15], a tool that
supported limited equational reasoning and was successfully applied to the anal-
ysis of many different protocols. In Maude-NPA we improve on the original NPA
in three ways. First of all, unlike NPA, which required considerable interaction
with the user, Maude-NPA is completely automated (see [7]). Secondly, its infer-
ence system has a formal basis in terms of rewriting logic and narrowing, which
allows us to provide proofs of soundness and completeness (see [4]). Finally,
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 25, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
10
5.
52
82
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
6 M
ay
 20
11
the tool’s inference system supports reasoning modulo the algebraic properties
of cryptographic and other functions (see [5, 3, 18]). Such algebraic properties
are expressed as equational theories E = E′ unionmulti Ax whose equations E′ are con-
fluent, coherent, and terminating rewrite rules modulo equational axioms Ax
such as commutativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativity-
commutativity plus identity (ACU) of some function symbols. The Maude-NPA
has then both dedicated and generic methods for solving unification problems
in such theories E = E′ unionmulti Ax [10, 11, 12], which under appropriate checkable
conditions [9] yield finitary unification algorithms.
Since Maude-NPA allows reasoning in the unbounded session model, and
because it allows reasoning about different equational theories (which typically
generate many more solutions to unification problems than syntactic unifica-
tion, leading to bigger state spaces), it is necessary to find ways of pruning the
search space in order to prevent infinite or overwhelmingly large search spaces.
One technique for preventing infinite searches is the generation of formal gram-
mars describing terms unreachable by the intruder (see [15, 4] and Section 4.1).
However, grammars do not prune out all infinite searches, since unbounded ses-
sion security is undecidable, and there is a need for other techniques. Moreover,
even when a search space is finite it may still be necessary to reduce it to a
manageable size, and state space reduction techniques for doing that will be
necessary. In this paper we describe some of the major state space reduction
techniques that we have implemented in Maude-NPA, and provide completeness
proofs and experimental evaluations demonstrating an average state-space size
reduction of 99% (i.e., the average size of the reduced state space is 1% of that of
the original one) in the examples we have evaluated. Furthermore, we show our
combined techniques effective in obtaining a finite state space for all protocols
in our experiments.
The optimizations we describe in this paper were designed specifically for
Maude-NPA, and work within the context of Maude-NPA search techniques.
However, although different tools use different models and search algorithms,
they all have a commonality in their syntax and semantics that means that,
with some adaptations, optimization techniques developed for one tool or type
of tools can be applied to different tools as well. Indeed, we have already seen
such common techniques arise, for example the technique of giving priority to
input or output messages respectively when backwards or forwards search is used
(used by us and by Shmatikov and Stern in [20]) and the use of the lazy intruder
(used by us and, in a different form, by the On-the-Fly Model Checker [1]). One
of our motivations of publishing our work on optimizations is to encourage the
further interaction and adaptation of the techniques for use in different tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in
Section 2, we describe in Section 3 the model of computation used by the Maude-
NPA. In Section 4, we describe the various state space reduction techniques that
have been introduced to control state explosion, and give proofs of their com-
pleteness as well as showing their relations to other optimization techniques in
the literature. We first briefly describe how automatically generated grammars
provide the main reduction that cuts down the search space. Then, we describe
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how we obtain a second important state-space reduction by reducing the num-
ber of logical variables present in a state. The additional state space reduction
techniques presented in this paper are: (i) giving priority to input messages
in strands, (ii) early detection of inconsistent states (that will never reach an
initial state), (iii) a relation of transition subsumption (to discard transitions
and states already being processed in another part of the search space), and
(iv) the super-lazy intruder (to delay the generation of substitution instances
as much as possible). In Section 5 we describe our experimental evaluation of
these state-space reduction techniques. In Section 6 we describe future work and
conclude the paper. This is an extended and improved version of [6], including
proofs of all the results, a refinement of the interaction between the transition
subsumption and the super-lazy intruder (Section 4.7.2), more examples and
explanations, as well as more benchmarked protocols.
2. Background on Term Rewriting
We follow the classical notation and terminology from [20] for term rewriting
and from [16, 17] for rewriting logic and order-sorted notions. We assume an
order-sorted signature Σ with a finite poset of sorts (S,≤) and a finite number
of function symbols. We assume an S-sorted family X = {Xs}s∈S of mutually
disjoint variable sets with each Xs countably infinite. TΣ(X )s denotes the set
of terms of sort s, and TΣ,s the set of ground terms of sort s. We write TΣ(X )
and TΣ for the corresponding term algebras. We write Var(t) for the set of
variables present in a term t. The set of positions of a term t is written Pos(t),
and the set of non-variable positions PosΣ(t). The subterm of t at position p
is t|p, and t[u]p is the result of replacing t|p by u in t. A substitution σ is a
sort-preserving mapping from a finite subset of X , written Dom(σ), to TΣ(X ).
The set of variables introduced by σ is Ran(σ). The identity substitution is
id. Substitutions are homomorphically extended to TΣ(X ). The restriction
of σ to a set of variables V is σ|V . The composition of two substitutions is
(σ ◦ θ)(X) = θ(σ(X)) for X ∈ X .
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t = t′, where t ∈ TΣ(X )s, t′ ∈ TΣ(X )s′ ,
and s and s′ are sorts in the same connected component of the poset (S,≤).
Given a set E of Σ-equations, order-sorted equational logic induces a congruence
relation =E on terms t, t
′ ∈ TΣ(X ) (see [17]). Throughout this paper we assume
that TΣ,s 6= ∅ for every sort s. We denote the E-equivalence class of a term
t ∈ TΣ(X ) as [t]E and the E-equivalence classes of all terms TΣ(X ) and TΣ(X )s
as TΣ/E(X ) and TΣ/E(X )s, respectively.
For a set E of Σ-equations, an E-unifier for a Σ-equation t = t′ is a substi-
tution σ s.t. σ(t) =E σ(t
′). A complete set of E-unifiers of an equation t = t′
is written CSUE(t = t
′). We say CSUE(t = t′) is finitary if it contains a finite
number of E-unifiers. CSU(t = t′) denotes a complete set of syntactic order-
sorted unifiers between terms t and t′, i.e., without any equational property.
A rewrite rule is an oriented pair l → r, where l 6∈ X and l, r ∈ TΣ(X )s
for some sort s ∈ S. An (unconditional) order-sorted rewrite theory is a triple
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R = (Σ, E,R) with Σ an order-sorted signature, E a set of Σ-equations, and
R a set of rewrite rules. A topmost rewrite theory (Σ, E,R) is a rewrite theory
s.t. for each l → r ∈ R, l, r ∈ TΣ(X )State for a top sort State, r 6∈ X , and no
operator in Σ has State as an argument sort.
The rewriting relation →R on TΣ(X ) is t
p→R t′ (or →R) if p ∈ PosΣ(t),
l → r ∈ R, t|p = σ(l), and t′ = t[σ(r)]p for some σ. The relation →R/E
on TΣ(X ) is =E ;→R; =E , i.e., t →R/E s iff ∃u1, u2 ∈ TΣ(X ) s.t. t =E u1,
u1 →R u2, and u2 =E s. Note that →R/E on TΣ(X ) induces a relation →R/E
on TΣ/E(X ) by [t]E →R/E [t′]E iff t→R/E t′.
When R = (Σ, E,R) is a topmost rewrite theory, we can safely restrict
ourselves to the general rewriting relation →R,E on TΣ(X ), where the rewriting
relation →R,E on TΣ(X ) is t
p→R,E t′ (or →R,E) if p ∈ PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R,
t|p =E σ(l), and t′ = t[σ(r)]p for some σ. Note that →R,E on TΣ(X ) induces
a relation →R,E on TΣ/E(X ) by [t]E →R,E [t′]E iff ∃w ∈ TΣ(X ) s.t. t →R,E w
and w =E t
′. We say that a term t is R,E-irreducible if there is no term t′ such
that t→R,E t′; this is extended to substitutions in the obvious way.
The narrowing relation  R on TΣ(X ) is t
p σ,R t′ (or  σ,R,  R) if p ∈
PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R, σ ∈ CSU(t|p = l), and t′ = σ(t[r]p). Assuming that
E has a finitary and complete unification algorithm, the narrowing relation
 R,E on TΣ(X ) is t
p σ,R,E t′ (or  σ,R,E ,  R,E) if p ∈ PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R,
σ ∈ CSUE(t|p = l), and t′ = σ(t[r]p).
The use of topmost rewrite theories is entirely natural for communication
protocols, since all state transitions can be viewed as changes of the global
distributed state. It also provides several advantages (see [21]): (i) as pointed
out above the relation→R,E achieves the same effect as the relation→R/E , and
(ii) we obtain a completeness result between narrowing ( R,E) and rewriting
(→R/E).
Theorem 1 (Topmost Completeness). [21] Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a topmost
rewrite theory, t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X ), and let σ be a substitution such that σ(t)→∗R,E t′.
Then, there are substitutions θ, τ and a term t′′ such that t;∗θ,R,E t
′′, σ(t) =E
τ(θ(t)), and t′ =E τ(t′′).
In this paper, we consider only equational theories E = E′ unionmulti Ax such
that the rewrite rules E′ are confluent, coherent, and terminating modulo
axioms Ax such as commutativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or
associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU) of some function symbols. We
also require axioms Ax to be regular, i.e., for each equation l = r ∈ Ax,
Var(l) = Var(r). Note that axioms such as commutativity (C), associativity-
commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU) are
regular. The Maude-NPA has then both dedicated and generic methods for
solving unification problems in such theories E′ unionmultiAx [10, 11, 12].
4
3. Maude-NPA’s Execution Model
Given a protocol P, we first explain how its states are modeled algebraically.
The key idea is to model protocol states as elements of an initial algebra TΣP/EP ,
where ΣP is the signature defining the sorts and function symbols for the
cryptographic functions and for all the state constructor symbols, and EP is
a set of equations specifying the algebraic properties of the cryptographic func-
tions and the state constructors. Therefore, a state is an EP -equivalence class
[t] ∈ TΣP/EP with t a ground ΣP -term. However, since the number of states
TΣP/EP is in general infinite, rather than exploring concrete protocol states
[t] ∈ TΣP/EP we explore symbolic state patterns [t(x1, . . . , xn)] ∈ TΣP/EP (X ) on
the free (ΣP , EP)-algebra over a set of variables X . In this way, a state pattern
[t(x1, . . . , xn)] represents not a single concrete state but a possibly infinite set
of such states, namely all the instances of the pattern [t(x1, . . . , xn)] where the
variables x1, . . . , xn have been instantiated by concrete ground terms.
In the Maude-NPA [4, 7], a state in the protocol execution is a term t of sort
State, t ∈ TΣP/EP (X)State. A state is then a multiset built by an associative
and commutative union operator & with identity operator ∅. Each element in
the multiset is either a strand or the intruder’s knowledge at that state, both
explained below.
A strand [13] represents the sequence of messages sent and received by a
principal executing the protocol or by the intruder. A principal sending (resp.
receiving) a message msg is represented by msg+ (resp. msg−). We write m±
to denote m+ or m−, indistinctively. We often write +(m) and −(m) instead
of m+ and m−, respectively. A strand is then a list [msg±1 , msg
±
2 , msg
±
3 ,
. . . , msg±k−1, msg
±
k ] describing the sequence of send and receive actions of a
principal role in a protocol, where each msgi is a term of a special sort Msg
described below, i.e., msgi ∈ TΣP/EP (X)Msg. In Maude-NPA, strands evolve
over time as the send and receive actions take place, and thus we use the
symbol | to divide past and future in a strand, i.e., [nil,msg±1 , . . . ,msg±j−1 |
msg±j ,msg
±
j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k , nil] where msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
j−1 are the past messages,
and msg±j ,msg
±
j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are the future messages (msg
±
j is the immediate
future message). The nils are present so that the bar may be placed at the
beginning or end of the strand if necessary. A strand [msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±
k ] is a
shorthand for [nil | msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k , nil]. We often remove the nils for clarity,
except when there is nothing else between the vertical bar and the beginning or
end of a strand. We write SP for the set of strands in the specification of the
protocol P, including the strands that describe the intruder’s behavior.
The intruder’s knowledge is represented as a multiset of facts unioned to-
gether with an associative and commutative union operator _,_ with identity
operator ∅. There are two kinds of intruder facts: positive knowledge facts (the
intruder knows message expression m, i.e., m∈I), and negative knowledge facts
(the intruder does not yet know m but will know it in a future state, i.e., m/∈I).
Maude-NPA uses a special sort Msg of messages that allows the protocol
specifier to describe other sorts as subsorts of the top sort Msg. The specifier
can make use of another special sort Fresh in the protocol-specific signature Σ for
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representing fresh unguessable values, e.g., nonces. The meaning of a variable of
sort Fresh is that it will never be instantiated by an E-unifier generated during
the protocol analysis. This ensures that if two nonces are represented using dif-
ferent variables of sort Fresh, they will never be identified and no approximation
for nonces is necessary. We make explicit the Fresh variables r1, . . . , rk(k ≥ 0)
generated by a strand by writing :: r1, . . . , rk :: [msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
n ], where each ri
appears first in an output message msg+ji and can later be used in any input and
output message of msg±ji+1, . . . ,msg
±
n . Fresh variables generated by a strand
are unique to that strand.
Let us introduce the well-known Diffie-Hellman protocol as a motivating
example.
Example 1. The Diffie-Hellman protocol uses exponentiation to share a secret
between two parties, Alice and Bob. There is a public constant, denoted by
g, which will be the base of the exponentiations. We represent the product of
exponents by using the symbol ∗. Nonces are represented by NX , denoting a
nonce created by principal X. Raising message M to the power of exponent X
is denoted by (M)X . Encryption of message M using the key K is denoted by
{M}K . The protocol description is as follows.
1. A ↪→ B : {A ; B ; gNA}
Alice sends her name, Bob’s name, and an exponentiation of a new nonce
NA created by her to Bob.
2. B ↪→ A : {A ; B ; gNB}
Bob sends his name, Alice’s name, and an exponentiation of a new nonce
NB created by him to Alice.
3. A ↪→ B : {secret}gNANB
Bob receives gNA and he raises it to the NB to obtain the key g
NANB .
He sends a secret to Alice encrypted using the key. Likewise, when Alice
receives gNB , she raises it to the NA, to obtain the key g
NBNA . We assume
that exponentiation satisfies the equation gNA
NB = gNA∗NB and that the
product operation _*_ is associative and commutative, so that
gNB
NA
= gNA
NB
= gNB∗NA
and therefore both Alice and Bob share the same key.
In the Maude-NPA’s formalization of the protocol, we explicitly specify the
signature Σ describing the sorts and operations for messages, nonces, etc. A
nonce NA is denoted by n(A, r), where r is a unique variable of sort Fresh.
Concatenation of two messages, e.g., NA and NB, is denoted by the oper-
ator ; , e.g., n(A, r) ; n(B, r′). Encryption of a message M is denoted by
e(A,M), e.g., {NB}KB is denoted by e(KB , n(B, r′)). Decryption is similarly
denoted by d(A,M). Raising a message M to the power of an exponent E
(i.e., ME) is denoted by exp(M,E), e.g., gNB is denoted by exp(g, n(B, r′)).
Associative-commutative multiplication of nonces is denoted by ∗ . A secret
generated by a principal is denoted by sec(A, r), where r is a unique variable
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of sort Fresh. The protocol-specific signature Σ contains the following subsort
relations (Name,Nonce,Secret,Enc,Exp < Msg) and (Gen,Exp < GenvExp) and
the following operators:
a, b, i : → Name g :→ Gen
n : Name× Fresh→ Nonce sec : Name× Fresh→ Secret
; : Msg ×Msg→ Msg e, d : Key ×Msg→ Enc
exp : GenvExp× Nonce→ Exp _*_ : Nonce× Nonce→ Nonce
In the following we will use letters A,B for variables of sort Name, letters r, r′, r′′
for variables of sort Fresh, and letters M,M1,M2, Z for variables of sort Msg;
whereas letters X,Y will also represent variables, but their sort will depend
on the concrete position in a term. The encryption/decryption cancellation
properties are described using the equations
e(X, d(X,Z)) = Z and d(X, e(X,Z)) = Z
in EP . The key algebraic property of exponentiation, zx
y
= zx∗y, is described
using the equation
exp(exp(W,Y ), Z) = exp(W,Y ∗ Z)
in EP (where W is of sort Gen instead of the more general sort GenvExp in order
to provide a finitary narrowing-based unification procedure modulo EP , see [3]
for details on this concrete equational theory). Although multiplication modulo
a prime number has a unit and inverses, we have only included the algebraic
properties that are necessary for Diffie-Hellman to work. The two strands P
associated to the protocol roles, Alice and Bob, shown above are:
:: r, r′ :: [ (A;B; exp(g, n(A, r)))+, (B;A;X)−, (e(exp(X,n(A, r)), sec(A, r′)))+]
:: r′′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′′)))+, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′′)),SR)−]
The following strands describe the intruder abilities according to the Dolev-Yao
attacker’s capabilities [2].
• [M−1 ,M−2 , (M1;M2)+] Concatenation
• [(M1;M2)−,M+1 ] Left-deconcatenation
• [(M1;M2)−,M+2 ] Right-deconcatenation
• [ K−,M−, e(K,M)+ ] Encryption
• [ K−,M−, d(K,M)+ ] Decryption
• [ M−1 ,M−2 , (M1 ∗M2)+ ] Multiplication
• [ M−1 ,M−2 , exp(M1,M2)+ ] Exponentiation
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• [ g+ ] Generator
• [ A+ ] All names are public
• :: r′′′ :: [ n(i, r′′′)+ ] Generation of intruder nonces
Note that the intruder cannot extract information from either an exponentiation
or a product of exponents, but can only compose them. Also, the intruder cannot
extract information directly from an encryption but it can indirectly by using a
decryption and the cancellation of encryption and decryption, which is an alge-
braic property, i.e., [K−, e(K,M)−,M+] =EP [K
−, e(K,M)−, d(K, e(K,m))+].
3.1. Backwards Reachability Analysis
Our protocol analysis methodology is then based on the idea of backwards
reachability analysis, where we begin with one or more state patterns corre-
sponding to attack states, and want to prove or disprove that they are un-
reachable from the set of initial protocol states. In order to perform such a
reachability analysis we must describe how states change as a consequence of
principals performing protocol steps and of intruder actions. This can be done
by describing such state changes by means of a set RP of rewrite rules, so that
the rewrite theory (ΣP , EP , RP) characterizes the behavior of protocol P mod-
ulo the equations EP . In the case where new strands are not introduced into
the state, the corresponding rewrite rules in RP are as follows1, where L,L1, L2
denote lists of input and output messages (+m,−m), IK, IK ′ denote sets of
intruder facts (m∈I,m/∈I), and SS, SS′ denote sets of strands:
[L | M−, L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK)→ [L,M− | L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK) (1)
[L | M+, L′] & SS & IK → [L,M+ | L′] & SS & IK (2)
[L | M+, L′] & SS & (M/∈I, IK)→ [L,M+ | L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK) (3)
In a forward execution of the protocol strands, Rule (1) describes a message
reception event in which an input message is received from the intruder; the
intruder’s knowledge acts in fact as the only channel through which all commu-
nication takes place. Rule (2) describes a message send in which the intruder’s
knowledge is not increased; it is irrelevant where the message goes. Rule (3) de-
scribes the alternative case of a send event such that the intruder’s knowledge
is positively increased. Note that Rule (3) makes explicit when the intruder
learned a message M , which was recorded in the previous state by the negative
fact M/∈I. A fact M/∈I can be paraphrased as: “the intruder does not yet know
M , but will learn it in the future”. This enables a very important restriction
of the tool, expressed by saying that the intruder learns a term only once [4]:
if the intruder needs to use a term twice, then he must learn it the first time
1To simplify the exposition, we omit the fresh variables at the beginning of each strand in
a rewrite rule.
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it is needed; if he learns a term and needs to learn it again in a previous state,
found later during the backwards search, then the state will be discarded as
unreachable. Note that Rules (1)–(3) are generic: they belong to RP for any
protocol P.
It is also the case that when we are performing a backwards search, only the
strands that we are searching for are listed explicitly: extra strands necessary to
reach an initial state are dynamically added to the state by explicit introduction
through protocol-specific rewrite rules (one for each output message u+ in an
honest or intruder strand in SP) as follows:
for each [ l1, u
+, l2 ] ∈ SP : [ l1 | u+, l2 ] &SS &(u/∈I, IK)→ SS&(u∈I, IK) (4)
where u denotes a message, l1, l2 denote lists of input and output messages
(+m,−m), IK denotes a set of intruder facts (m∈I,m/∈I), and SS denotes a
set of strands. For example, intruder concatenation of two learned messages,
as well as the learning of such a concatenation by the intruder, is described as
follows:
[M−1 ,M
−
2 | (M1;M2)+] & SS & ((M1;M2)/∈I, IK)→ SS & ((M1;M2)∈I, IK)
This rewrite rule can be understood, in a backwards search, as “in the current
state the intruder is able to learn a message that matches the pattern M1;M2
if he is able to learn message M1 and message M2 in prior states”. In summary,
for a protocol P, the set RP of rewrite rules obtained from the protocol strands
SP that are used for backwards narrowing reachability analysis modulo the
equational properties EP is RP = {(1), (2), (3)} ∪ (4). These rewrite rules give
the basic execution model of Maude-NPA. However, as we shall see, it will later
be necessary to modify them in order to optimize the search. In later sections of
this paper we will show how these rules can be modified to optimize the search
while still maintaining completeness.
On the other hand, the assumption that algebraic properties are expressed as
equational theories E = E′unionmultiAx whose equations E′ are confluent, coherent, and
terminating rewrite rules modulo regular equational axioms Ax such as commu-
tativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity
plus identity (ACU) of some function symbols, implies some extra conditions
on the rewrite theory RP (see [4]). Namely, for any term m∈I (resp. term m−)
and any E′,Ax-irreducible substitution σ, σ(m)∈I (resp. (σ(m))−) must be
E′,Ax-irreducible. This is because many of our optimization techniques rely on
the assumption that terms have a unique normal form modulo a regular equa-
tional theory, and achieve their results by reasoning about the normal forms of
terms.
Finally, states have, in practice, another component containing the actual
message exchange sequence between principal or intruder strands (i..e, all the
expressions m± exchanged between the honest and intruder strands). We do
not make use of the message exchange sequence until Section 4.7.2, so we delay
its introduction until there.
The way to analyze backwards reachability is then relatively easy, namely,
to run the protocol “in reverse.” This can be achieved by using the set of rules
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R−1P , where v −→ u is in R−1P iff u −→ v is in RP . Reachability analysis can be
performed symbolically, not on concrete states but on symbolic state patterns
[t(x1, . . . , xn)]EP by means of narrowing modulo EP (see Section 2). We call
attack patterns those states patterns (i.e., terms with logical variables) used to
start the narrowing-based backwards reachability analysis. An initial state is a
state where all strands have their vertical bar at the beginning and there is no
positive fact of the form u∈I for a message term u in the intruder’s knowledge.
If no initial state is found during the backwards reachability analysis from an
attack pattern, the protocol has been proved secure for that attack pattern with
respect to the assumed intruder capabilities and the algebraic properties. If an
initial state is found, then we conclude that the attack pattern is possible and a
concrete attack can be inferred from the exchange sequence stored in the initial
state. Note that an initial state may be generic, in the sense of having logical
variables for those elements that are not relevant for the attack.
Example 2. (Example 1 continued) The attack pattern that we are looking for
is one in which Bob completes the protocol and the intruder is able to learn the
secret. The attack state pattern to be given as input to Maude-NPA is:
:: r′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− |nil ]
& SS & (sec(a, r′′)∈I, IK) (†)
Using the above attack pattern Maude-NPA is able to find an initial state of the
protocol, showing that the attack state is possible. Note that this initial state is
generalized to two sessions in parallel: one session where Alice (i.e., principal
named a) is talking to another principal B′ —in this session the intruder gets a
nonce n(a, r) originated from a— and another session where Bob (i.e., principal
named b) is trying to talk to Alice. If we instantiate B′ to be b, then one
session is enough, although the tool returns the most general attack. The strands
associated to the initial state found by the backwards search are as follows:
[nil | exp(g, n(a, r)))−, Z−, exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r))+] &
[nil | exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r))−, e(exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′))−, sec(a, r′′)+] &
[nil | exp(g, n(b, r′)))−,W−, exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′))+] &
[nil | exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′))−, sec(a, r′′)−, e(exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′)), sec(a, r′′))+] &
[nil | (a; b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))−, (b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))+] &
[nil | (b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))−, exp(g, n(b, r′))+] &
[nil | (a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))−, (B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+] &
[nil | (B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))−, exp(g, n(a, r))+] &
:: r′ ::
[nil | (a; b; exp(g,W ))−, (a; b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))+, e(exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′)), sec(a, r′′))−] &
:: r′′, r ::
[nil | (a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+, (a;B′; exp(g, Z))−, e(exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′))+]
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Note that the last two strands, generating fresh variables r, r′, r′′, are protocol
strands and the others are intruder strands.
The concrete message exchange sequence obtained by the reachability analysis
is the following:
1.(a; b; exp(g,W ))−
2.(a; b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))+
3.(a; b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))−
4.(b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))+
5.(b; exp(g, n(b, r′)))−
6.(exp(g, n(b, r′)))+
7.(exp(g, n(b, r′)))−
8.W−
9.exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′))+
10.(a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+
11.(a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))−
12.(B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+
13.(B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))−
14.(exp(g, n(a, r)))+
15.(exp(g, n(a, r)))−
16.Z−
17.exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r))+
18.(a;B′; exp(g, Z))−
19.e(exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′))+
20.e(exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′))−
21.exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r))−
22.sec(a, r′′)+
23.exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′))−
24.sec(a, r′′)−
25.e(exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′), sec(a, r′′))+
26.e(exp(g,W ∗ n(b, r′)).sec(a, r′′))−
Step 1) describes Bob (i.e., principal named b) receiving an initiating message
from the intruder impersonating Alice. Step 2) describes Bob sending the re-
sponse, and Step 3) describes the intruder receiving it. Steps 4) through 9)
describe the intruder computing the key exp(g,W ∗n(b, r′)) she will use to com-
municate with Bob. Step 10) describes Alice initiating the protocol with a prin-
cipal B′. Step 11) describes the intruder receiving it, and steps 11) through
17) describe the intruder constructing the key exp(g, Z ∗ n(a, r)) she will use to
communicate with Alice. Steps 18) and 19) describe Alice receiving the response
from the intruder impersonating B′ and Alice sending the encrypted message.
Steps 20) through 22) describe the intruder decrypting the message to get the
secret. In steps 23) through 25) the intruder re-encrypts the secret with the key
she shares with Bob and sends it, and in Step 26) Bob receives the message.
Note that there are some intruder strands missing in the initial state because
certain terms are assumed to be trivially generable by the intruder, and so not
searched for; namely, intruder strands generating variable Z, variable W , term
(a; b; exp(g,W )), and term (a;B′; exp(g, Z)). Variables Z and W can be filled
in with any nonce, for instance nonces generated by the intruder, such as W =
n(i, r′′′) and Z = n(i, r′′′′) in the following way:
:: r′′′ :: [nil | (n(i, r′′′))+] & :: r′′′′ :: [nil | (n(i, r′′′′))+]
Also, note that nonces W and Z are used by the intruder to generate messages
(a; b; exp(g,W )) and (a;B′; exp(g, Z)) in the following way:
[nil | (a)+] & [nil | (b)+] & [nil | (B′)+] &
[nil | (g)+] & [nil | (g)−,W−, exp(g,W )+] & [nil | (g)−, Z−, exp(g, Z)+] &
[nil | (a)−, (b)−, (a; b)+] & [nil | (a; b)−, (exp(g,W ))−, (a; b; exp(g,W ))+] &
[nil | (a)−, (B′)−, (a;B′)+] & [nil | (a;B′)−, (exp(g, Z))−, (a;B′; exp(g, Z))+]
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4. State Space Reduction Techniques
In this section we present Maude-NPA’s state space reduction techniques.
Before presenting them, we formally identify two classes of states that can be
safely removed: unreachable and redundant states. We begin the presentation
with the notion of grammars, and its associated state space reduction technique,
which is the oldest Maude-NPA technique and does much to identify and remove
non-terminating search paths. In many cases (although not all) this is enough
to turn an infinite search space into a finite one. We then describe a number
of simple techniques which remove states that can be shown to be unreachable,
thus saving the cost of searching for them. We conclude by describing two
powerful techniques for eliminating redundant states: subsumption partial order
reduction and the super-lazy intruder, and we prove their completeness.
First, the Maude-NPA satisfies a very general completeness result.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). [4] Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , RP) representing protocol P, and a non-initial state St (with logi-
cal variables), if there is a substitution σ and an initial state Stini such that
σ(St)→∗
R−1P ,EP
Stini, then there are substitutions σ
′, ρ and an initial state St′ini
such that St;∗
σ′,R−1P ,EP
St′ini, σ =EP σ
′ ◦ ρ, and Stini =EP ρ(St′ini).
Our optimizations are able to identify two kinds of unproductive states:
unreachable and redundant states.
Definition 1 (Unreachable States). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , RP) representing protocol P, a state St (with logical variables) is un-
reachable if there is no sequence St ;∗
σ,R−1P ,EP
Stini leading to an initial state
Stini.
Definition 2 (Redundant States). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , RP) representing protocol P and a state St (with logical variables), a
backwards narrowing step St;σ1,R−1P ,EP
St1 is called redundant (or just state
St1 is identified as redundant) if for any initial state Stini1 reachable from
St1, i.e., St1 ;
∗
θ1,R
−1
P ,EP
Stini1, there are states St2 and Stini2, a narrowing
step St ;σ2,R−1P ,EP
St2, a narrowing sequence St2 ;
∗
θ2,R
−1
P ,EP
Stini2, and a
substitution ρ such that σ1 ◦ θ1 =EP σ2 ◦ θ2 ◦ ρ and Stini1 =EP ρ(Stini2).
There are three reasons for wanting to detect unproductive backwards narrowing
reachability steps. One is to reduce, if possible, the initially infinite search space
to a finite one, as it is sometimes possible to do with the use of grammars,
by removing unreachable states. Another is to reduce the size of a (possibly
finite) search space by eliminating unreachable states early, i.e., before they are
eliminated by exhaustive search. This elimination of unreachable states can
have an effect far beyond eliminating a single node in the search space, since
a single unreachable state may appear multiple times and/or have multiple
descendants. Finally, if there are several steps leading to the same initial state,
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as for redundant states, then it is also possible to use various partial order
reduction techniques that can further shrink the number of states that need to
be explored.
4.1. Grammars
The Maude-NPA’s ability to reason effectively about a protocol’s algebraic
properties is a result of its combination of symbolic reachability analysis us-
ing narrowing modulo equational properties (see Section 2), together with its
grammar-based techniques for reducing the size of the search space. The key
idea of grammars is to detect terms t in positive facts t∈I of the intruder’s
knowledge of a state St that will never be transformed into a negative fact
θ(t)/∈I in any initial state St′ backwards reachable from St. This means that
St can never reach an initial state and therefore it can be safely discarded. Here
we briefly explain how grammars work as a state space reduction technique
and refer the reader to [14, 4] for further details. Automatically generated gram-
mars 〈G1, . . . , Gm〉 represent unreachability information (or co-invariants), i.e.,
typically infinite sets of states unreachable from an initial state. These auto-
matically generated grammars are very important in our framework, since in
the best case they can reduce the infinite search space to a finite one, or, at
least, can drastically reduce the search space.
Example 3. Consider again the attack pattern (†) in Example 2. After a couple
of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state:
[ nil | (M ; sec(a, r′′))−, (sec(a, r′′))+ ] &
:: r′ :: [(A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
( (M ; sec(a, r′′))∈I, e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, sec(a, r′′)/∈I )
which corresponds to the intruder obtaining (i.e., learning) the message sec(a, r′′)
from a bigger message (M ; sec(a, r′′)), although the contents of variable M
have not yet been found by the backwards reachability analysis. This process of
adding more and more intruder strands that look for terms (M ′;M ; sec(a, r′′))
(M ′′;M ′;M ; sec(a, r′′)), . . . can go on forever. Note that if we carefully check
the strands for the protocol, we can see that the honest strands either never
produce a message with normal form “M ; secret” or such a message is under
a public key encryption (and thus the intruder cannot get the contents), so the
previous state is clearly unreachable and can be discarded. The grammar, which
is generated by Maude-NPA, capturing the previous state as unreachable, is as
follows:
grl M inL => e(K, M) inL . ;
grl M inL => d(K, M) inL . ;
grl M inL => (M ; M’) inL . ;
grl M inL => (M’ ; M) inL . ;
grl M notInI,
M notLeq exp(g, n(A, r)),
M notLeq B ; exp(g, n(A, r’)) => (M’ ; M) inL .)
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where all the productions and exceptions refer to normal forms of messages w.r.t.
the equational theory EP .
Intuitively, the last production rule in the grammar above says that any term
with normal form M ′;M cannot be learned by the intruder if the subterm M is
different from exp(g, n(A, r)) and B; exp(g, n(A, r′)) (i.e., it does not match such
patterns) and the constraint M/∈I appears explicitly in the intruder’s knowledge
of the current state being checked for unreachability. Moreover, any term of any
of the following normal forms: e(A,M), d(A,M), (M ′;M), or (M ;M ′) cannot
be learned by the intruder if subterm M is also not learnable by the intruder.
4.2. Public data
The simplest optimization possible is one that can be provided explicitly by
the user. When we are searching for some data that we know is easy to learn by
the intruder, the tool can avoid this by assuming that such data is public. Such
data is considered public by using a special sort Public and a subsort definition,
e.g. “subsort Name < Public”. That is, given a state St that contains an
expression t∈I in the intruder’s knowledge where t is of sort Public, we can
remove the expression t∈I from the intruder’s knowledge, since the backwards
reachability steps taken care of such a t∈I are necessary in order to lead to
an initial state but their inclusion in the message sequence is superfluous. The
completeness proof for this optimization is trivial and thus omitted.
4.3. Limiting Dynamic Introduction of New Strands
As pointed out in Section 3.1, rules of type (4) allow the dynamic introduc-
tion of new strands. However, new strands can also be introduced by unification
of a state containing a variable SS denoting a set of strands and one of the rules
of (1), (2), and (3), where variables L and L′ denoting lists of input/output
messages will be introduced by instantiation of SS. The same can happen with
new intruder facts of the form X∈I, where X is a variable, by instantiation of
a variable IK denoting the rest of the intruder knowledge.
Example 4. Consider a state St of the form SS& IK where SS denotes a set
of strands and IK denotes a set of facts in the intruder’s knowledge. Now,
consider Rule (1):
SS′& [L | M−, L′] & (M∈I, IK ′)→ SS′& [L,M− | L′] & (M∈I, IK ′)
The following backwards narrowing step applying such a rule can be performed
from St = SS& IK using the unifier σ = {SS 7→ SS′& [L,M− | L′], IK 7→
(M∈I, IK ′)}
SS & IK
σ R,E SS′& [L | M−, L′] & (M∈I, IK ′)
but this backwards narrowing step is unproductive, since it is not guided by the
information in the attack state. Indeed, the same rule can be applied again using
variables SS′ and IK ′ and this can be repeated many times.
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In order to avoid a huge number of unproductive narrowing steps by useless
instantiation, we allow the introduction of new strands and/or new intruder
facts only by rule application instead of just by unification. For this, we do two
things:
1. we remove any of the following variables from attack patterns: SS denot-
ing a set of strands, IK denoting a set of intruder facts, and L,L′ denoting
a set of input/output messages; and
2. we replace Rule (1) by the following Rule (5), since we do no longer have
a variable denoting a set of intruder facts that has to be instantiated:
SS& [L | M−, L′] & (M∈I, IK)→SS& [L,M− | L′] & IK (5)
Note that in order to replace Rule (1) by Rule (5) we have to assume that the in-
truder’s knowledge is a set of intruder facts without repeated elements, i.e., the
union operator _,_ is ACUI (associative-commutative-identity-idempotent).
This is completeness-preserving, since it is in line with the restriction in [4]
that the intruder learns a term only once.
Furthermore, one might imagine that Rule (3) and rules of type (4) must
also be modified in order to remove the M∈I expression from the intruder’s
knowledge of the right-hand side of each rule. However, this is not so, since, by
keeping the expresion M∈I, we force the backwards application of the rule only
when there is indeed a message for the intruder to be learned. This provides
some form of on-demand evaluation of the protocol.
The completeness proof for this optimization is trivial and thus omitted.
However, since we have modified the set of rules used for backwards reachability,
we prove that such modification has the same reachability capabilities. The set
of rewrite rules actually used for backwards narrowing is RP = {(5), (2), (3)} ∪
(4). The following result ensures that RP and RP compute similar initial states
by backwards reachability analysis. Its proof is straightforward.
Definition 3 (Inclusion). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP)
representing protocol P, and two states St1, St2, we abuse notation and write
St1 ⊆EP St2 to denote that every state element (i.e., strand or intruder fact)
in St1 appears in St2 (modulo EP).
Proposition 1. Let RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) be a topmost rewrite theory repre-
senting protocol P. Let St = ss&SS& (ik, IK) where ss is a term repre-
senting a set of strands, ik is a term representing a set of intruder facts, SS
is a variable for strands, and IK is a variable for intruder knowledge. Let
St′ = ss& ik. If there is an initial state Stini and a substitution σ such that
St;∗
σ,R−1P ,EP
Stini, then there is an initial state St
′
ini and two substitutions σ
′,
ρ such that St′ ;∗
σ′,RP
−1
,EP
St′ini, σ =EP σ
′ ◦ ρ, and ρ(St′ini) ⊆EP Stini.
4.4. Partial Order Reduction Giving Priority to Input Messages
The different rewrite rules on which the backwards narrowing search from
an attack pattern is based are in general executed non-deterministically. This
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is because the order of execution can make a difference as to what subsequent
rules can be executed. For example, an intruder cannot receive a term until it
is sent by somebody, and that send action within a strand may depend upon
other receives in the past. There is one exception, Rule (5) (originally Rule
(1)), which, in a backwards search, only moves a negative term appearing right
before the bar into the intruder’s knowledge.
Example 5. For instance, consider the attack pattern (†) in Example 2.
Since the strand in the attack pattern has the input message
(e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− but also has the intruder challenge sec(a, r′′)∈I,
there are several possible backwards narrowing steps: some processing the in-
truder challenge, and Rule (5) processing the input message.
The execution of Rule (5) in a backwards search does not disable any other
transitions; indeed, it only enables send transitions. Thus, it is safe to execute
it at each stage before any other transition. For the same reason, if several
applications of Rule 5 are possible, it is safe to execute them all at once before
any other transition. Requiring all executions of Rule 5 to execute first thus
eliminates interleavings of Rule 5 with send and receive transitions, which are
equivalent to the case in which Rule 5 executes first. In practice, this typi-
cally cuts down in half the search space size. The completeness proof for this
optimization is trivial and is thus omitted.
Similar strategies have been employed by other tools in forward searches. For
example, in [19], a strategy is introduced that always executes send transitions
first whenever they are enabled. Since a send transition does not depend on any
other component of the state in order to take place, it can safely be executed
first. The original NPA also used this strategy; it had a receive transition
(similar to the input message in Maude-NPA) which had the effect of adding
new terms to the intruder’s knowledge, and which always was executed before
any other transition once it was enabled.
4.5. Early Detection of Inconsistent States
There are several types of states that are always unreachable or inconsistent.
Example 6. Consider again the attack pattern (†) in Example 2. After a cou-
ple of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state,
where the intruder learns e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)) by assuming she can
learn exp(Y, n(B, r′)) and sec(a, r′′) and combines them:
[ nil | (exp(Y, n(B, r′)))−, (sec(a, r′′))−, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))+ ] &
:: r′ ::
[ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(sec(a, r′′)∈I, exp(Y, n(B, r′))∈I, e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))/∈I)
(‡)
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From this state, the intruder tries to learn sec(a, r′′) by assuming she can
learn messages (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))) and exp(Y, n(B, r′)) and com-
bines them in a decryption:
[ nil | (exp(Y, n(B, r′)))−, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))−, (sec(a, r′′))+ ] &
[ nil | (exp(Y, n(B, r′)))−, (sec(a, r′′))−, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))+ ] &
:: r′ ::
[ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(sec(a, r′′)∈I, exp(Y, n(B, r′))∈I,
e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))/∈I)
But then this state is inconsistent, since we have both the challenge
e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I and the already learned message
e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))/∈I) at the same time, violating the learn-only-once
condition in Maude-NPA.
If the Maude-NPA attempts to search beyond an inconsistent state, it will
never find an initial state. For this reason, the Maude-NPA search strategy
always marks the following types of states as unreachable, and does not search
beyond them any further:
1. A state St containing two contradictory facts t∈I and t/∈I (modulo EP)
for a term t.
2. A state St whose intruder’s knowledge contains the fact t/∈I and a strand
of the form [m±1 , . . . , t
−, . . . ,m±j−1 | m±j , . . . ,m±k ] (modulo EP).
3. A state St containing a fact t∈I such that t contains a fresh variable r and
the strand in St indexed by r, i.e., :: r1, . . . , r, . . . , rk :: [m
±
1 , . . . ,m
±
j−1 |
m±j , . . . ,m
±
k ], cannot produce r, i.e., r is not a subterm of any output
message in m±1 , . . . ,m
±
j−1.
4. A state St containing a strand of the form [m±1 , . . . , t
−, . . . ,m±j−1 | m±j ,
. . . ,m±k ] for some term t such that t contains a fresh variable r and the
strand in St indexed by r cannot produce r.
Note that case 2 will become an instance of case 1 after some backwards narrow-
ing steps, and the same happens with cases 4 and 3. The proof of inconsistency
of cases 1 and 3 is straightforward.
4.6. Transition Subsumption
Partial order reduction (POR) techniques are common in state exploration.
However, POR techniques for narrowing-based state exploration do not seem to
have been explored in detail, although they may be extremely relevant and may
afford greater reductions than in standard state exploration based on ground
terms rather than on terms with logical variables. For instance, the simple
concept of two states being equivalent modulo renaming of variables does not
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apply to standard state exploration, whereas it does apply to narrowing-based
state exploration. In [8], Escobar and Meseguer studied narrowing-based state
exploration and POR techniques, which may transform an infinite-state system
into a finite one. However, the Maude-NPA needs a dedicated POR technique
applicable to its specific execution model.
Let us motivate this POR technique with an example before giving a more
detailed explanation.
Example 7. Consider again the attack pattern (†) in Example 2. After a couple
of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the state (‡) of Example 6:
[ nil | exp(Y, n(B, r′))−, sec(a, r′′)−, (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))+ ] &
:: r′ ::
[ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(sec(a, r′′)∈I, exp(Y, n(B, r′))∈I, e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))/∈I)
However, the following state is also generated after a couple of narrowing steps
from the attack pattern, where, thanks to the equational theory, variable Y is
instantiated to exp(G,N) for G a generator –indeed the constant g— and N a
nonce variable:
[ nil | exp(G,n(B, r′))−, N−, exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′))+ ] &
[ nil | exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′))−, sec(a, r′′)−, (e(exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))+ ] &
:: r′ :: [ (A;B; exp(G,N))−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+
| (e(exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(sec(a, r′′)∈I, exp(G,n(B, r′)∈I, N∈I,
exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′)/∈I, e(exp(G,N ∗ n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))/∈I)
However, the unreachability of the second state is implied (modulo EP) by the
unreachability of the first state; unreachability in the sense of Definition 1. In-
tuitively, the challenges present in the first state that are relevant for backwards
reachability are included in the second state, namely, the challenges sec(a, r′′)∈I
and exp(Y, n(B, r′)∈I. Indeed, the unreachability of the following “kernel” state
implies the unreachability of both states, although this kernel state is never com-
puted by the Maude-NPA:
:: r′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(sec(a, r′′)∈I, exp(Y, n(B, r′)∈I)
Note that the converse is not true, i.e., the second state does not imply the first
one, since it contains one more intruder item relevant for backwards reachability
purposes, namely N∈I.
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Let us now formalize this state space reduction and prove its completeness.
First, an auxiliary relation St1 .St2 identifying whether St1 is smaller than St2
in terms of messages to be learned by the intruder.
Definition 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) represent-
ing protocol P, and two non-initial states St1 and St2, we write St1 . St2 (or
St2 / St1) if each intruder fact of the form t∈I in St1 appears in St2 (modulo
EP) and each non-initial strand in St1 appears in St2 (modulo EP and with the
vertical bar at the same position).
Then, we define the relation St1 I St2 which extends St1 . St2 to the case
where St1 is more general than St2 w.r.t. variable instantiation.
Definition 5 (P-subsumption relation). Given a topmost rewrite theory
RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2,
we write St1 I St2 (or St2 J St1) and say that St2 is P-subsumed by St1 if
there is a substitution θ s.t. θ(St1) . St2.
Note that we restrict the relation I to non-initial states because, otherwise,
an initial state will imply any other state, erroneously making the search space
finite after an initial state has been found.
The following results provide the appropriate connection between
P-subsumption and narrowing transitions. First, we consider the simplest case
where, given two non-initial states St1, St2 such that St1 I St2, a narrow-
ing step on St2, yielding state St
′
2, does not affect the transition subsumption
property I and thus St1 I St′2. The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 1. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2. If (i) there is a substitution θ s.t.
θ(St1) . St2, i.e., St1 I St2, (ii) there is a narrowing step St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2,
(iii) each intruder fact of the form t∈I in σ2(θ(St1)) appears in St′2 (modulo
EP) and (iv) each non-initial strand in σ2(θ(St1)) appears in St′2 (modulo EP),
then σ2(θ(St1)) . St
′
2, i.e., St1 I St′2.
Second, we consider what happens when, given two non-initial states St1, St2
such that St1 I St2, a narrowing step on St2, yielding state St′2, does affect the
transition subsumption property I and thus St1 6I St′2. The proof is straight-
forward.
Lemma 2. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2. If (i) there is a substitution θ s.t.
θ(St1) . St2, i.e., St1 I St′2, (ii) there is a narrowing step St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2,
and (iii) σ2(θ(St1)) 6 . St′2, i.e., St1 6I St′2, then either (a) there is an intruder
fact of the form t∈I in σ2(θ(St1)) that does not appear in St′2 (modulo EP),
or (b) there is a non-initial strand in σ2(θ(St1)) that does not appear in St
′
2
(modulo EP).
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Now, we can consider both cases of Lemma 2 separately: either an expression
t∈I in St′2 or a non-initial strand in St′2, not appearing in the instantiated
version of St1. First, the case where an expression t∈I in St′2 does not appear
in the instantiated version of St1.
Lemma 3. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2. If (i) there is a substitution θ s.t.
θ(St1) . St2, i.e., St1 I St′2, (ii) there is a narrowing step St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2,
and (iii) there is an intruder fact of the form t∈I in σ2(θ(St1)) that does not
appear in St′2 (modulo EP), then (a) t/∈I does appear in St′2 (modulo EP) and
(b) there is a state St′1 and a substitution σ1 such that St1 ;σ1,R−1P ,EP St
′
1 and
either St′1 is an initial state or there is a substitution ρ s.t. ρ(St
′
1) . St
′
2, i.e.,
St′1 I St′2,
Proof. We prove the result by considering the different rules applicable to St2
(remember that in R, rewriting and narrowing steps always happen at the top
position). Note that property (a) is immediate because rules in RP do not
remove expressions of the form m∈I. Note also that if t∈I does appear in St2
(modulo EP) and t/∈I does appear in St′2 (modulo EP), then only Rule (3) or
rules of type (4) have been applied to St2 as follows:
• Reversed version of Rule (3), i.e., St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2 using the following
rule
[L,M+ | L′] &SS& (M∈I, IK)→ [L | M+, L′] &SS& (M/∈I, IK).
Recall that there is an intruder fact in σ2(θ(St1)) of the form t∈I for t a
message term that does not appear in St′2 (modulo EP) and t =EP σ2(M).
Thus, σ2(M)∈I does appear in σ2(θ(St1)) (modulo EP). Here we have
several cases:
– If the strand σ2([L,M
+ | L′]) appears in σ2(θ(St1)), then the very
same narrowing step can be performed on St1, i.e., there exist σ1, ρ
such that St1 ;σ1,R−1P ,EP
St′1 with the same rule and θ ◦ σ2 =EP
σ1 ◦ ρ. Thus, either St′1 is an initial state or ρ(St′1) . St′2, since:
(i) each positive intruder fact in σ2(θ(St1)) of the form u∈I for u a
message term, except σ2(M)∈I, appears in ρ(St′1) (modulo EP), (ii)
σ2(M)/∈I appears in ρ(St′1) (modulo EP), (iii) each non-initial strand
in σ2(θ(St1)), except σ2([L,M
+ | L′]), has not been modified and
appears in ρ(St′1) as well (modulo EP), and (iv) for σ2([L,M
+ | L′])
in σ2(θ(St1)), ρ
′([L |M+, L′]) appears in ρ(St′1) and in St′2.
– If the strand σ2([LmM
+ | L′]) does not appear in σ2(θ(St1)), then
the strand σ2([L,M
+ | L′]) corresponds to a strand SP in the pro-
tocol specification that had been introduced via a rule of the set
(4), where the strand’s bar was clearly more to the right than in
σ2([L,M
+ | L′]). Note that it cannot correspond to a strand included
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originally in the attack pattern, because we assume that St1 and St2
are states generated by backwards narrowing from the same attack
state and then both St1 and St2 should have the strand. There-
fore, since the strand σ2([L,M
+ | L′]) corresponds to a strand in SP
and the set (4) contains a rewrite rule for each strand of the form
[ l1, u
+, l2 ] in SP , there must be a rule α in (4) introducing a strand
of the form [ l1, u
+, l2 ] and there must be substitutions σ1, ρ such
that St1 ;σ1,R−1P ,EP
St′1 using the rule α and θ◦σ2 =EP σ1◦ρ. Thus,
either St′1 is an initial state or ρ(St
′
1).St
′
2, since: (i) each positive in-
truder fact in σ2(θ(St1)) of the form u∈I for u a message term, except
σ2(M)∈I, appears in ρ(St′1) (modulo EP), (ii) σ2(M)/∈I appears in
ρ(St′1) (modulo EP), (iii) each non-initial strand in σ2(θ(St1)) has
not been modified and appears in ρ(St′1) as well (modulo EP), and
(iv) σ2([ l1 | u+, l2 ]) appears in ρ(St′1) and in St′2.
• Rules in (4), i.e., St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2 using a rule of the form
{SS& (u∈I, IK)→ [l1 | u+, l2] &SS& (u/∈I, IK) | [l1, u+, l2] ∈ P}.
Recall that there is an intruder fact in σ2(θ(St1)) of the form t∈I for t a
message term that does not appear in St′2 (modulo EP) and t =EP σ2(u),
where u is the message term used by the rewrite rule. Thus, σ2(u)∈I does
appear in σ2(θ(St1)) (modulo EP). That is, the same narrowing step is
available from σ2(θ(St1)) and there exist σ1, ρ such that St1 ;σ1,R−1P ,EP
St′1 with the same rule and θ ◦σ2 =EP σ1 ◦ρ. Thus, either St′1 is an initial
state or ρ(St′1) . St
′
2.
This concludes the proof. 2
Second, the case where a non-initial strand in St′2 does not appear in the
instantiated version of St1.
Lemma 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2. If (i) there is a substitution θ s.t.
θ(St1) . St2, (ii) there is a narrowing step St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP
St′2, and (iii) there
is a non-initial strand [m±1 , . . . ,m
±
i | m±i+1, . . . ,m±n ] in σ2(θ(St1)) that does
not appear in St′2 (modulo EP), then (a) σ2|Var(St2) = id, (b) [m±1 , . . . ,m±i−1 |
m±i , . . . ,m
±
n ] does appear in St
′
2 (modulo EP) and (c) there is a state St
′
1 such
that St1 ;id,R−1P ,EP
St′1 and either St
′
1 is an initial state or St
′
1 . St
′
2.
Proof. We prove the result by considering the different rules applicable to
St2 (remember that in R, rewriting and narrowing steps always happen at the
top position). Note that property (a) is immediate because rules in RP do
not remove strands, only move the vertical bar to the left of the sequences of
messages in the strands. Note also that if [m±1 , . . . ,m
±
i | m±i+1, . . . ,m±n ] appears
in σ2(θ(St1)) and [m
±
1 , . . . ,m
±
i−1 | m±i , . . . ,m±n ] appears in St′2, then only Rule
(2) or Rule (5) have been applied to St2 as follows:
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• Reversed version of Rule (2), i.e., St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2 using the following
rule
[L,M+ | L′] &SS& IK → [L | M+, L′] &SS& IK.
• Reversed version of Rule (5), i.e., St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP St
′
2 using the following
rule
[L,M− | L′] &SS& IK → [L | M−, L′] &SS& (M∈I, IK).
However, note that σ2|Var(St2) = id in both possible rewrite steps. Then, there
is a state St′1 such that St1 ;id,R−1P ,EP St
′
1 with the same rule and it is straight-
forward that either St′1 is an initial state or St
′
1 I St′2, since only the vertical
bar has been moved. 2
Now we can formally define the relation between P-subsumption and one
narrowing step. In the following, ;
{0,1}
σ,R−1P ,EP
denotes zero or one narrowing
steps.
Lemma 5. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2. If St1 I St2 and
St2 ;σ2,R−1P ,EP
St′2, then there is a state St
′
1 and a substitution σ1 such that
St1 ;
{0,1}
σ1,R
−1
P ,EP
St′1 and either St
′
1 is an initial state or St
′
1 I St′2.
Proof. Since St1 I St2, there is a substitution θ s.t. θ(St1) . St2. If each
intruder fact of the form t∈I in σ2(θ(St1)) appears in St′2 (modulo EP) and
each non-initial strand in σ2(θ(St1)) appears in St
′
2 (modulo EP), then, by
Lemma 1, σ2(θ(St1)) . St
′
2, i.e., St1 I St′2. Otherwise, Lemma 2 states that
either (a) there is an intruder fact of the form t∈I in σ2(θ(St1)) that does not
appear in St′2 (modulo EP), or (b) there is a non-initial strand in σ2(θ(St1))
that does not appear in St′2 (modulo EP). For case (a), by Lemma 3, there is
a state St′1 and a substitution σ1 such that St1 ;σ1,R−1P ,EP St
′
1 and either St
′
1
is an initial state or there is a substitution ρ s.t. ρ(St′1) . St
′
2. For case (b), by
Lemma 4, σ2|Var(St2) = id, and there is a state St′1 such that St1 ;id,R−1P ,EP St
′
1
and either St′1 is an initial state or St
′
1 . St
′
2, i.e., St
′
1 I St′2. 2
Preservation of reachability follows from the following main theorem. Note
that the relation I is applicable only to non-initial states, whereas the relation
⊆EP of Definition 3 is applicable to both initial and non-initial states.
Theorem 3. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) representing
protocol P and two states St1, St2. If St1 I St2, Stini2 is an initial state, and
St2 ;
∗
σ2,R
−1
P ,EP
Stini2 , then there is an initial state St
ini
1 and substitutions σ1
and θ such that St1 ;
∗
σ1,R
−1
P ,EP
Stini1 , and θ(St
ini
1 ) ⊆EP Stini2 .
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Proof. Consider St2 = U0, St
ini
2 = Un, σ2 = ρ1 · · · ρn, and U0 ;nρi,R−1P ,EP
Un. Note that n 6= 0, since St2 cannot be an initial state because St1 I St2
implies that both St1 and St2 are not initial states. Then, by Lemma 5, there
is j ≤ n such that for each i < j, Ui−1 ;ρi,R−1P ,EP Ui and there is a step
U ′i−1 ;ρ′i,R−1P ,EP U
′
i s.t. U
′
i I Ui. Note that U ′j is an initial state and there is a
substitution θ s.t. θ(U ′j) ⊆EP Uj ⊆EP Un. 2
This POR technique is used as follows: we keep all the states of the back-
wards narrowing-based tree and compare each new leaf node of the tree with
all the previous states in the tree. If a leaf node is P-subsumed by a previously
generated node in the tree, we discard such leaf node.
4.7. The Super-Lazy Intruder
Sometimes terms appear in the intruder’s knowledge that are trivially learn-
able by the intruder. These include terms initially available to the intruder
(such as names) and variables. In the case of variables, specially, the intruder
can substitute any arbitrary term of the same sort as the variable,2 and so there
is no need to try to determine all the ways in which the intruder can do this.
For this reason it is safe, at least temporarily, to drop these terms from the
state. We will refer to those terms as (super) lazy intruder terms.
Example 8. Consider again the attack pattern (†) in Example 2. After a couple
of backwards narrowing steps, the Maude-NPA finds the following state that
considers how the intruder can learn sec(a, r′′) by assuming he can learn a
message e(K, sec(a, r′′)) and the key K:
[ nil | K−, e(K, sec(a, r′′)))−, sec(a, r′′)+ ]&
:: r′ ::
[ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ]&
(e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, K∈I, e(K, sec(a, r′′)))∈I, sec(a, r′′)/∈I)
(\)
Here variable K is a super-lazy term and the tool wouldn’t search for values.
The problem, of course, is that later on in the search the variable K may be-
come instantiated, in which case the term then becomes relevant to the search.
Indeed, after some more backwards narrowing steps, the tool tries to unify mes-
sage e(K, sec(a, r′′))) with an output message e(exp(X,n(A, r)), sec(A, r2)) of
an explicitly added Bob’s strand of the form
:: r1, r2 ::
[ (A;B; exp(g, n(A, r1)))
+, (B;A;X)−, (e(exp(X,n(A, r)), sec(A, r2)))+]
2This, of course, is subject to the assumption that the intruder can produce at least one
term of that sort. But since the intruder is assumed to have access to the network and to all
the operations available to an honest principal, this is a reasonable restriction to make.
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thus getting an instantiation for the super-lazy term K, namely
{K 7→ exp(X,n(A, r))}.
Note that the tool might continue searching for an initial state when a super
lazy term is properly instantiated, and this would not cause the tool to prove
an insecure protocol to be secure. However, it would lead to an unacceptably
large number of false attacks because the contents of variable K are expected
to be learned by the intruder too.
We take an approach similar to that of the lazy intruder of Basin et al. [1]
and extend it to a more general case, that we call super-lazy terms. We note
that this use of what we here call the super-lazy intruder was also present in
the original NPA.
The set L(St) of super-lazy terms w.r.t. a state St is inductively generated
as a subset L(St) ⊆ TΩ(Y ∪ IK0) where IK0 is the basic set of terms known
by the intruder at the beginning of a protocol execution, Y is a subset of the
variables of St, and Ω is the set of operations available to the intruder. The idea
of super-lazy terms is that we also want to exclude from L(St) the set IK 6∈(St)
of terms that the intruder does not know and all its possible combinations with
symbols in Ω.
Definition 6 (Super-lazy terms). Let RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) be a topmost
rewrite theory representing protocol P. Let IK0 be the basic set of terms known
by the intruder at the beginning of a protocol execution, defined as
IK0 = {t′ | [t+] ∈ SP , t′ =EP t}. Let Ω be the set of operations available
to the intruder, defined as
Ω = {f : s1 · · · sn → s | [(X1:s1)−, . . . , (Xk:sk)−, (f(X1:s1, . . . , Xk:sk))+] ∈ SP}.
Let St be a state (with logical variables). Let IK 6∈(St) be the set of terms that
the intruder does not known at state St, defined as IK 6∈(St) = {m′ | (m/∈I) ∈
St, m′ =EP m}. The set L(St) of super-lazy terms w.r.t. St (or simply super-
lazy terms) is defined as
1. IK0 ⊆ L(St),
2. Var(St)− IK 6∈(St) ⊆ L(St),
3. for each f : s1 · · · sn → s ∈ Ω and for all t1:s1, . . . , tk:sk ∈ L(St), if
f(t1:s1, . . . , tk:sk) 6∈ IK 6∈(St), then f(t1:s1, . . . , tk:sk) ∈ L(St).
The idea behind the super-lazy intruder is that, given a term made out of lazy
intruder terms, such as “a; e(K,Y )”, where a is a public name and K and Y are
variables, the term “a; e(K,Y )” is also a (super) lazy intruder term by applying
the operations e and ; .
Let us first briefly explain how the (super) lazy intruder mechanism works
before formally describing it. A ghost state is a state extended to allow expres-
sions of the form ghost(m) in the intruder’s knowledge, where m is a super-lazy
term. When, during the backwards reachability analysis, we detect a state St
having a super lazy term t in an expression t∈I in the intruder’s knowledge, we
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replace the intruder fact t∈I in St by ghost(t) and keep the ghost version of St
in the history of states used by the transition subsumption of Section 4.6. For
instance, the state (\) of Example 8 with a super-lazy intruder term K would
be represented as follows, where we have just replaced K∈I by ghost(K):
[ nil | K−, e(K, sec(a, r′′)))−, sec(a, r′′)+ ]&
:: r′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ]&
(ghost(K), e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, e(K, sec(a, r′′)))∈I, sec(a, r′′)/∈I)
If later in the search tree we detect a ghost state St′ containing an expression
ghost(t) such that t is no longer a super lazy intruder term, then there is a state
St with an expression ghost(u) that precedes St′ in the narrowing tree such that
the message u has been instantiated to t in an appropriate way and we must
reactivate such original state St. That is, we “roll back” and replace the current
state St′, containing expression ghost(t), by an instantiated version of state St,
namely θ(St), where t =EP θ(u). This is explained in detail in Definition 11
below.
However, if the substitution θ binding variables in u includes variables of
sort Fresh, we have to keep them in the reactivated version of St, since they are
unique in our model. Therefore, the strands indexed by these fresh variables
must also be included in the “rolled back” state, even if they were not there
originally. Moreover, they must have the bar at the place where it was when the
strands were originally introduced. We show below how this is accomplished.
Furthermore, if any of the strands thus introduced have other variables of sort
Fresh as subterms, then the strands indexed by those variables must be included
too, and so on. That is, when a state St′ properly instantiating a ghost expres-
sion ghost(t) is found, the procedure of rolling back to the original state St
that gave rise to that ghost expression implies not only applying the bindings
for the variables of t to St, but also introducing in St all the strands from St′
that produced fresh variables and that either appear in the variables of t or are
recursively connected with them.
Example 9. For instance, after the tool finds an instantiation for variable K,
the tool rolls back to the state originating the super-lazy term K as follows,
where we have copied the explicitly added Bob’s strand with the vertical bar at
the rightmost position because it is the strand generating the Fresh variable r′′:
[ nil | exp(X,n(a, r))−, e(exp(X,n(a, r), sec(a, r′′)))−, sec(a, r′′)+ ]&
:: r, r′′ ::
[ (a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+, (B′; a;X)−, (e(exp(X,n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′)))+ | nil ]&
:: r′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ]&
(e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, exp(X,n(a, r))∈I,
e(exp(X,n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′)))∈I, sec(a, r′′)/∈I)
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In order for the super-lazy intruder mechanism to be able to tell where the
bar was when a strand was introduced, we must modify the set of rules of type
(4) introducing new strands:
{ [ l1 |u+] & {u/∈I,K} → {u∈I,K} | [ l1, u+, l2 ] ∈ SP} (6)
Note that rules of type (4) introduce strands [ l1 | u+, l2 ], whereas here rules of
type (6) introduce strands [ l1 | u+ ]. This slight modification makes it possible
to safely move the position of the bar back to the place where the strand was
introduced. However, now the strands added may be partial, since the whole
sequence of actions performed by the principal is not directly recorded in the
strand. Therefore, the set of rewrite rules used by narrowing in reverse are now
R˜P = {(5), (2), (3)} ∪ (6).
First, we define a new relation vEP between states, which is similar to ⊆EP
of Definition 3 but considers partial strands.
Definition 7 (Partial Inclusion). Given two states St1, St2, we abuse nota-
tion and write St1 vEP St2 to denote that every intruder fact in St1 appears
in St2 (modulo EP) and that every strand [m±1 , . . . ,m
±
k ] in St1, either appears
in St2 (modulo EP) or there is i ∈ {1, . . . , k} s.t. m±i = m+i and [m±1 , . . . ,m+i ]
appears in St2 (modulo EP).
The following result ensures that if a state is reachable via backwards reachabil-
ity analysis using RP , then it is also reachable using R˜P . Its proof is straight-
forward.
Proposition 2. Let RP = (ΣP , EP , RP) be a topmost rewrite theory repre-
senting protocol P. Let St = ss&SS& (ik, IK) where ss is a term repre-
senting a set of strands, ik is a term representing a set of intruder facts,
SS is a variable for strands, and IK is a variable for intruder knowledge.
If there is an initial state Stini and a substitution σ such that
St ;∗
σ,R−1P ,EP
Stini, then there is an initial state St
′
ini and two substitutions
σ′, ρ such that St;∗
σ′,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ini, σ =EP σ
′ ◦ ρ, and ρ(St′ini) vEP Stini.
Now, we describe how to reactivate a state. First, we formally define a ghost
state.
Definition 8 (Ghost State). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , RP) representing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder
fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, we define the ghost version of St,
written St, by replacing t∈I in St by ghost(t) in St.
Now, in order to resuscitate a state, we need to formally compute the strands
that are generating Fresh variables relevant to the instantiation found for the
super-lazy term.
Definition 9 (Strand Reset). Given a strand s of the form :: r1, . . . , rk ::
[m±1 , . . . | . . . ,m±n ], when we want to move the bar to the rightmost position
(denoting a final strand), we write s =:: r1, . . . , rk :: [m±1 , . . . ,m±n | nil].
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Definition 10 (Fresh Generating Strands). Given a state St containing an
intruder fact ghost(t) for some term t with variables, we define the set of strands
associated to t, denoted strandsSt(t), as follows:
• for each strand s in St of the form :: r1, . . . , rk :: [m±1 , . . . | . . . ,m±n ],
if there is i ∈ {1, . . . , k} s.t. ri ∈ Var(t), then s is included into
strandsSt(t); or
• for each strand s in St of the form :: r1, . . . , rk :: [m±1 , . . . | . . . ,m±n ], if
there is another strand s′ of the form :: r′1, . . . , r
′
k′ :: [w
±
1 , . . . | . . . , w±n′ ]
in strandsSt(t), and there are i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n′} s.t. ri ∈
Var(wj), then s is included into strandsSt(t).
Now, we formally define how to resuscitate a state.
Definition 11 (Resuscitation). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder
fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, i.e., St = ss& (t∈I, ik) where ss is
a term denoting a set of strands and ik is a term denoting the rest of the in-
truder knowledge. Let St be the ghost version of St. Let St′ be a state such that
St ;∗
σ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ and σ(t) is not a super-lazy term. Let σt = σ|Var(t). The
reactivated (or resuscitated) version of St w.r.t. state St′ and substitution σt
is defined as Ŝt = σt(ss) &σt(ik) & strandsSt′(σt(t)).
Let us now prove the completeness of this state space reduction technique.
Theorem 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing
protocol P and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a
super-lazy term, if there exist an initial state Stini and substitution θ such that
St;∗
θ,R˜P
−1
,EP
Stini , then (i) there exist a state St
′ and substitutions τ, τ ′ such
that St ;∗
τ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′, θ =EP τ ◦ τ ′, and τ(t) is not a super-lazy term, and
(ii) there exist a reactivated version Ŝt of St w.r.t. St′ and τ , an initial state
St′ini , and substitutions θ
′, ρ such that Ŝt;∗
θ′,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ini , θ =EP θ
′ ◦ ρ, and
ρ(St′ini) ⊆EP Stini .
Proof. The sequence from St to Stini can be decomposed into two fragments,
computing substitutions τ , τ ′, respectively, such that τ is the smallest part
of θ that makes τ(t) not a super-lazy term. That is, there is a state St′
and substitutions τ , τ ′ such that τ(t) is not a super-lazy term, θ = τ ◦ τ ′,
St ;∗
τ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ ;∗
τ ′,R˜P
−1
,EP
Stini , and the sequence St ;
∗
τ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′
can be viewed as St = St0 ;τ1,R˜P
−1
,EP
· · · ;
τk,R˜P
−1
,EP
Stk = St
′ such that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, τi(t) is a super-lazy term. However, using the com-
pleteness results of narrowing, Theorem 1, there must be a narrowing sequence
from St computing such substitution τ . That is, there is a state St′′ such that
St;∗
τ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′′ and St′′ differs from St′ (modulo EP -equivalence and vari-
able renaming) only in that τ(t)∈I is replaced by ghost(τ(t)). Let τt = τ |Var(t),
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there exists a substitution τ ′′ s.t. τ =EP τt ◦ τ ′′. Let Ŝt be the resuscitated
version of St w.r.t. state St′′ and substitution τt. Then, by narrowing com-
pleteness, i.e., Theorem 1, there exist a state St′ini and substitutions σ, ρ such
that Ŝt;∗
σ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ini , τ
′′ ◦ τ ′ =EP σ ◦ ρ, and ρ(St′ini) =EP Stini . 2
4.7.1. Improving the Super-Lazy Intruder.
When we detect a state St with a super lazy term t, we may want to analyze
whether the variables of t may be eventually instantiated or not before creating
a ghost state. The following definition provides the key idea.
Definition 12 (Void Super-Lazy Term). Given a topmost rewrite theory
RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing protocol P, and a state St containing an in-
truder fact t∈I such that t is a super-lazy term, if for each strand [m±1 , . . . ,m±j−1 |
m±j , . . . ,m
±
k ] in St and each i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, Var(t) ∩ Var(mi) = ∅, and for
each term w∈I in the intruder’s knowledge, Var(t) ∩ Var(w) = ∅, then, t is
called a void super-lazy term.
Proposition 3. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) represent-
ing protocol P and a state St containing an intruder fact t∈I such that t is a
void super-lazy term, let St be the ghost version of St w.r.t. the void super-
lazy term t. If there exist an initial state Stini and a substitution θ such that
St ;∗
θ,R˜P
−1
,EP
Stini , then there exist an initial state St
′
ini and substitutions
σ, ρ such that St;∗
σ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ini , θ =EP σ ◦ ρ, and ρ(St′ini) ⊆EP Stini .
Proof. Since t is a super-lazy term, Stini contains a sequence of intruder
strands of SP generating t. Let θt = θ|Var(t), there exists a substitution θ′
s.t. θ =EP θt ◦ θ′. Since t is a void super-lazy term, there is a state St′′ini such
that θ′(St)→∗
R˜P
−1
,EP
St′′ini . Then, by narrowing completeness, i.e., Theorem 1,
there are an initial state St′ini and substitutions σ, ρ such that St ;
∗
σ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ini , θ
′ =EP σ ◦ ρ, and ρ(St′ini) ⊆EP St′′ini . Finally, St′′ini ⊆EP Stini , since
Stini simply has the strands generating t that St
′′
ini does not contain. 2
4.7.2. Interaction with Transition Subsumption.
When a ghost state is reactivated, we see from the above definition that such
a reactivated state will be P-subsumed by the original state that raised the ghost
expression. Therefore, the transition subsumption relation I of Section 4.6
has to be slightly modified to avoid checking a resuscitated state against its
predecessor ghost state. Now, let us formally state this problem.
Definition 13 (Resuscitated Child). Given a topmost rewrite theory RP =
(ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing protocol P and two non-initial states St and St′ such
that St contains an intruder fact t∈I and t is a super-lazy term, we say St′ is
a resuscitated child of St, written Sty St′, if:
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1. given the ghost version St of St w.r.t. the super-lazy term t, then there
exist states St1, . . . , Stk, substitutions τ1, . . . , τk, and i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that
St;
τ1,R˜P
−1
,EP
St1 · · ·Sti−1 ;τi,R˜P−1,EP Sti · · ·Stk−1 ;τk,R˜P−1,EP Stk,
τj(t) is a super-lazy term for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1, and τi(t) is not a super-lazy
term, and
2. given the reactivated version S˜t of St w.r.t. Sti and τ = τ1 ◦ · · · ◦ τi and
τt = τ |Var(t), there exist substitutions τ ′1, . . . , τ ′k such that τj = τt ◦ τ ′j for
1 ≤ j ≤ k, states St′1, . . . , St′k, and a narrowing sequence
S˜t;
τ ′1,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′1 · · ·St′k−1 ;τ ′k,R˜P−1,EP St
′
k
3. then there is j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that St′ =EP St′j.
Proposition 4. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) represent-
ing protocol P and two non-initial states St and St′ such that St contains an
intruder fact t∈I and t is a super-lazy term, if St y St′, then St I St′ and
reachability completeness is lost.
Proof. Since St is similar to St but t∈I has been replaced by ghost(t), and Ŝt
contains all the strands and positive intruder facts of St but instantiated with
τ |Var(t), then for the sequences
St;
τ1,R˜P
−1
,EP
St1 · · ·Stk−1 ;τk,R˜P−1,EP Stk
and
S˜t;
τ ′1,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′1 · · ·St′k−1 ;τ ′k,R˜P−1,EP St
′
k
we have that Stj I St′j for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, since St′j contains all the strands
and positive intruder facts of Stj but instantiated with τ |Var(t). Reachability
completeness is lost because if there is an initial state Stini and substitution
τ ′ such that St ;∗
τ,R˜P
−1
,EP
St′ ;∗
τ ′,R˜P
−1
,EP
Stini , then, since St is replaced
by St during the backwards reachability analysis and later St is replaced by
Ŝt, when Maude-NPA finds that Stj I St′j , it removes St′j from the backwards
reachability analysis, (possibly) leaving no successor of St leading to Stini . 2
The simplest way of ensuring whether or not St1 y St2 is to examine the
relative positions of St1 and St2 in the search tree as well as the narrowing steps
between them in the form established by Definition 13. However, for reasons
of efficiency, we want to keep examinations of the search tree to a minimum,
and restrict ourselves as much as possible to looking at information in the state
itself. Thus, we make use of information that is already in the state, the message
sequence first mentioned in Section 3.1. We find, that after making minor
modifications to this message sequence to take account of resuscitated ghosts, a
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simple syntactic check on the sequence can provide a relation that approximates
y.
In order to formally identify when a resuscitated state must not be erro-
neously discarded by I, we extend protocol states to have the actual message
exchange sequence between principal or intruder strands and add a new expres-
sion resuscitated(m) to indicate when a state has been resuscitated. The actual
set of rewrite rules extended to compute the exchange sequence is as follows,
where X is a variable denoting an exchange sequence:
[L | M−, L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK) & (M−, X)→ [L,M− | L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK) & X
[L | M+, L′] & SS & IK & (M+, X)→ [L,M+ | L′] & SS & IK & X
[L | M+, L′] & SS & (M/∈I, IK) & (M+, X)→ [L,M+ | L′] & SS & (M∈I, IK) & X
for each [ l1, u
+
, l2 ] ∈ SP : [ l1 | u+, l2 ] &SS & (u/∈I, IK) & (u+, X)→ SS& (u∈I, IK) & X
Completeness reachability is obviously preserved for this set of rules and for
the obvious extensions to RP and R˜P . For instance, the resuscitated state of
Example 9 will be written as follows, where the resuscitated message is the first
item in the exchange sequence:
[ nil | exp(X,n(a, r))−, e(exp(X,n(a, r), sec(a, r′′)))−, sec(a, r′′)+ ] &
:: r, r′′ ::
[ (a;B′; exp(g, n(a, r)))+, (B′; a;X)−, (e(exp(X,n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′)))+ | nil ] &
:: r′ :: [ (A;B;Y )−, (B;A; exp(g, n(B, r′)))+ | (e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))− ] &
(e(exp(Y, n(B, r′)), sec(a, r′′))∈I, exp(X,n(a, r))∈I,
e(exp(X,n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′)))∈I, sec(a, r′′)/∈I) &
(resuscitated(exp(X,n(a, r))), exp(X,n(a, r)))−, e(exp(X,n(a, r)), sec(a, r′′)))−,
(sec(a, r′′))+, (exp(Y, n(b, r′)))−, (sec(a, r′′))−, (e(exp(Y, n(b, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))+,
(e(exp(Y, n(b, r′)), sec(a, r′′)))−)
In [6], we provided a very simple rule for approximating Definition 13.
Definition 14. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) represent-
ing protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, we write St1 99K St2 if either
St1 does not contain an expression ghost(m) for a message term m or St1 does
contain an expression ghost(m) for a message term m but St2 does not contain
the expression resuscitated(m).
The following result establishes that 99K is an approximation of y. The
proof is straightforward.
Lemma 6. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, if St1 y St2, then St1 99K St2.
Now, we can provide a better transition subsumption relation.
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Definition 15 (P-subsumption relation II). Given a topmost rewrite the-
ory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing protocol P and two non-initial states
St1, St2, we write St1 III St2 and say that St2 is P-subsumed by St1 if there
is a substitution θ s.t. θ(St1) . St2 and θ(St1) 699K St2.
Reachability completeness is straightforward from Lemma 6 and Proposition 4,
since St1 699K St2 implies St1 6y St2.
Though this method solves the problem, it disables almost completely the
transition subsumption for those states after a resuscitation, since 99K is a bad
approximation of y. Here, we provide a more concise definition of the interac-
tion between the transition subsumption and the super-lazy intruder reduction
techniques.
We characterize those states after a resuscitation that are truly linked to
the parent state. First, we identify those states that are directly resuscitated
versions of a former state. Intuitively, by comparing the exchange sequences
of the two states, we can see whether the exchange sequence of the former is
(L1, L2,M
−
1 , L3) and it has a ghost expression ghost(M1), whereas the exchange
sequence of the resuscitated version is (L1, resuscitated(M1), L2,M
−
1 , L3).
Definition 16. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) represent-
ing protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, we say that St2 is a direct
resuscitated version of St1, written S1  St2, if there are messages M1 and M2
and a substitution ρ such that
1. state St1 has a ghost of the form ghost(M1),
2. the exchange sequence of state St1 is of the form
(L1, L2,M
−
1 , L3)
3. the exchange sequence of state St2 is of the form
(L′1, resuscitated(M2), L
′
2,M
−
2 , L
′
3),
4. and ρ(L1, L2,M
−
1 , L3) =EP (L
′
1, L
′
2,M
−
2 , L
′
3).
Relation  is closer to y.
Lemma 7. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, if St1  St2, then St1 y St2.
However, St1 y St2 does not imply St1  St2 and we have to go even
further. Relation St1  St2 takes into account only whether St2 is a re-
suscitated version of St1, but does not consider what happens beyond the
state that produced the instantiation that reactivated the ghost state. In-
tuitively, now we compare the exchange sequences of the two states to see
whether the exchange sequence of the first is (L1, L2, L3,M
−
1 , L4) and it has
a ghost expression ghost(M1), whereas the exchange sequence of the second is
(L1,M
+
1 , L2, resuscitated(M1), L3,M
−
1 , L4). Indeed, a recursive definition can
be given here that becomes extremely useful when several resuscitations have
happened in a concrete state.
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Definition 17. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) represent-
ing protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, we say that St2 is a resusci-
tated version of St1, written S1 + St2, if S1  St2 or there are messages M1
and M2, a substitution ρ, and sequences L
′
1, L
′′
1 such that:
1. state St1 has a ghost of the form ghost(M1),
2. the exchange sequence of state St1 is of the form
(L1, L2, L3,M
−
1 , L4)
3. the exchange sequence of state St2 is of the form
(L′1, L
′′
1 ,M
+
2 , L
′
2, resuscitated(M2), L
′
3,M
−
2 , L
′
4)
4. ρ(L2, L3,M
−
1 , L4) =EP (L
′
2, L
′
3,M
−
2 , L
′
4)
5. L′′1 is the longest sequence such that each message m
± in L′′1 has message
ρ(M1) as a subterm
6. and either
(a) ρ(L1) =EP L
′
1 or
(b) St′1 + St′2 where St′1 is St1 without the ghost(M1) expression and
St′2 is St2 with the shorter exchange sequence (L
′
1, L
′
2, L
′
3,M
−
2 , L
′
4).
The following result establishes that + is a better approximation of y
than 99K. The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 8. Given a topmost rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing
protocol P and two non-initial states St1, St2, if St1 y St2, then St1 + St2.
Now, we can provide a better transition subsumption relation.
Definition 18 (P-subsumption relation III). Given a topmost rewrite the-
ory RP = (ΣP , EP , R˜P) representing protocol P and two non-initial states
St1, St2, we write St1 IIII St2 and say that St2 is P-subsumed by St1 if there
is a substitution θ s.t. θ(St1) . St2 and St1 6+ St2.
Finally, reachability completeness is straightforward from Lemma 8 and
Proposition 4, since St1 6+ St2 implies St1 6y St2.
5. Experimental Evaluation
In Table 1, we summarize the experimental evaluation of the impact of the
different state space reduction techniques for various example protocols search-
ing up to depth 4. We measure several numerical values for the techniques: (i)
number of states at each backwards narrowing step, and (ii) whether the state
space is finite or not. The experiments have been performed on a MacBook with
2 Gb RAM using Maude 2.6. All protocol specifications are included in the of-
ficial Maude-NPA distribution3. The protocols are the following: (i) NSPK,
3Available at http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/Maude-NPA.
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Protocol none Grammars %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 4 12 49 185 758 81
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 4 12 50 190 804 79
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 1 2 6 15 36 89
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 6 17 111 493 3823 21
DH 1 14 38 151 816 1 6 14 37 105 87
Protocol none Input First %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 11 123 1669 26432 N/A 0
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 11 123 1666 26291 N/A 0
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 11 133 1977 32098 N/A 0
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 11 127 3402 N/A N/A 0
DH 1 14 38 151 816 14 135 1991 44157 N/A 0
Protocol none Inconsistency %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 5 18 95 310 650 83
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 5 18 95 310 650 83
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 1 6 22 114 326 5
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 6 18 107 439 3335 31
DH 1 14 38 151 816 1 12 12 56 128 84
Protocol none Transition Subsumption %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 5 15 61 107 237 94
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 5 15 61 107 237 94
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 1 6 15 39 78 77
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 6 15 61 165 506 89
DH 1 14 38 151 816 1 14 26 102 291 64
Protocol none Super-lazy Intruder %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 5 19 136 641 3951 1
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 5 19 136 641 3949 2
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 1 6 22 119 340 2
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 6 16 44 134 424 91
DH 1 14 38 151 816 1 14 38 138 525 35
Protocol none All optimizations %
NSPK 5 19 136 642 4021 4 6 4 2 1 99
NSL 5 19 136 642 4019 4 7 6 2 0 99
SecReT06 1 6 22 119 346 2 3 2 - - 99
SecReT07 6 20 140 635 4854 5 1 1 1 - 99
DH 1 14 38 151 816 4 6 10 9 12 99
Table 1: Number of states for 1,2,3, and 4 backwards narrowing steps comparing each opti-
mization of Sections 4.1,4.4,4.5,4.6, and 4.7.
the standard Needham-Schroeder protocol, (ii) NSL, the standard Needham-
Schroeder protocol with Lowe’s fix (which is secure and our tool can prove it),
(iii) SecReT06, a protocol with an attack using type confusion and a bounded
version of associativity that we presented in [5], (iv) SecReT07, a short ver-
sion of the Diffie-Hellman protocol that we presented in [3], and (v) DH, the
Diffie-Hellman protocol of Example 1. Note that the label “-” means that the
reachability analysis finished some levels before and the label “N/A” means that
the execution was stopped after a reasonably large execution time.
The overall percentage of state-space reduction for each protocol and an
average (99%) suggest that our combined techniques are remarkably effective
(the reduced number of states is on average only 1% or less of the original number
of states). The state reduction achieved by consuming input messages first is
difficult to analyze, since the reduction shown in Table 1 for this optimization
(labelled as “Input First”) is 0. The reason is that it can reduce the number of
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Protocol Finite State Space Achieved by:
NSPK Grammars and Subsumption
NSL Grammars and Subsumption
SecReT06 Subsumption or (Grammars and Lazy)
SecReT07 Subsumption and Lazy
DH Grammars and Subsumption
Table 2: Finite state space achieved by reduction techniques
states in protocols that contain several input messages in the strands, as in the
NSPK protocol, but in general it simply reduces the length of the narrowing
sequences and therefore more states can be generated at an earlier depth of the
narrowing tree compared to the case where the optimization is not used. Table
2 summarizes the different techniques yielding a finite space for each protocol.
The use of grammars and the transition subsumption are clearly the most useful
techniques in general. Indeed, all examples have a finite search space thanks to
the combined use of the different state space reduction techniques. Note that
grammars are insufficient to obtain a finite space for the SecReT07 example,
while subsumption and the super lazy intruder are essential in this case.
6. Concluding Remarks
The Maude-NPA can analyze the security of cryptographic protocols, mod-
ulo given algebraic properties of the protocol’s cryptographic functions in exe-
cutions with an unbounded number of sessions and with no approximations or
data abstractions. In this full generality, protocol security properties are well-
known to be undecidable. The Maude-NPA uses backwards narrowing-based
search from a symbolic description of a set of attack states by means of patterns
to try to reach an initial state of the protocol. If an attack state is reachable
from an initial state, the Maude-NPA’s complete narrowing methods are guar-
anteed to prove it. But if the protocol is secure, the backwards search may be
infinite and never terminate.
It is therefore very important, both for efficiency and to achieve full verifi-
cation whenever possible when a protocol is secure, to use state-space reduction
techniques that: (i) can drastically cut down the number of states to be ex-
plored; and (ii) have in practice a good chance to make the, generally infinite,
search space finite without compromising the completeness of the analysis; that
is, so that if a protocol is indeed secure, failure to find an attack in such a fi-
nite state space guarantees the protocol’s security for that attack relative to the
assumptions about the intruder actions and the algebraic properties. We have
presented a number of state-space reduction techniques used in combination by
the Maude-NPA for exactly these purposes. We have given precise character-
izations of theses techniques and have shown that they preserve completeness,
so that if no attack is found and the state space is finite, full verification of the
given security property is achieved.
Using several representative examples we have also given an experimental
evaluation of these techniques. Our experiments support the conclusion that,
34
when used in combination, these techniques: (i) typically provide drastic state
space reductions; and (ii) they can often yield a finite state space, so that
whether the desired security property holds or not can in fact be decided auto-
matically, in spite of the general undecidability of such problems.
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